Mirrors, Illusions and Epistemic Innocence

I examine some accounts that articulate the content of perception that occurs by means of a mirror. The defended account entails that a right hand seen in the mirror does not "become" a left hand

Representational Advantages

Descriptive metaphysics investigates our naive ontology as this is articulated in the content of our perception or of our pre-reflective thought about the world. But is access to such content reliable? Sceptics about the standard modes of access (introspection, or language-driven intuitions) may think that investigations in descriptive metaphysics can be aided by the controlled findings of cognitive science. Cognitive scientists have studied a promising range of representational advantages, that is, ways in which cognition favours one type of entity over another. The notion of representational advantage is investigated and some scepticism is expressed as to its appropriateness for use in descriptive metaphysics

How I managed to hide my shadow

A special type of visual stimulus is described which gives the perceiver the impression that a shadow has been hidden behind a surface in the image, contrary to expectations based on ecological situations in which covering a shadow only passes it on to the cover

Is the Object Concept Formal?

Uncorrected ProofsThis review article explores several senses in which it can be held that the (actual, psychological) concept of an object is a formal concept, as opposed, here, to being a sortal concept. Some recent positions both from the philosophical and psychological literature are analyzed: Object-sortalism (Xu), quasi-sortalist reductive strategies (Bloom), qualified sortalism (Wiggins), demonstrative theories (Fodor), and anti-sortalism (Ayers)

La philosophie du son : Bibliographie

Chapitre 1

Towards a cognitively oriented database of early shadow depictions

A vision based taxonomy of early shadow depiction

Methodological issues in the study of the depiction of cast shadows

The relationships between art and cognition constitute a very wide set of largely unexplored and at times undefined or much too speculative problems. The field is narrowed down by imposing some constraints. It is proposed that the depiction of cast shadows, in its early history, could provide an ideal case study which conforms to the constraints. This paper addresses some methodological problems of the study of this case. A sample of relevant Renaissance images is discussed. A typology of depicted cast shadows is proposed upon which further empirical research could be built

Are shadows transparent? An investigation on white, shadows and transparency in pictures

Shadow perception and transparency perception appear to use very similar rules, to the point that from the perceptual point of view shadows have been considered an instance of transparent objects. We claim that in spite of the similarities, shadows ought not to be considered transparent entities. The discussion has consequences both for the issue of the location of shadows, and for the conceptualization of transparency, and it provides insight into the inner complexities of the conceptual structure of visual concepts

Review of: Diego Marconi, Lexical Competence, MIT Press

A critical notice of Diego Marconi's book "Lexical Competence"

L'uso delle intuizioni in filosofia

I assess some recent positions about the role of intuitions in philosophy. I first describe the use of intuitions in mental experiments. Then I discuss philosophers who put great weight on intuitions. I suggest that intuitions can be explananda in the philosophical endeavour alongside other explananda. I propose a typology of existing intuitions. I then introduce the issue of the variability of intuitions and suggest some remedies